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VOLUME XL FEBRuARY, 1934 NuimEa 2
PRECEDENTS' PLACE IN LATIN LAW
GORDON IRELAND*
"Comprehension must be the soil in which
shall grow all the fruits of friendship. ""
As comparative law moves in the United States toward a firm
recognition in the curricula of the law schools,' the consciousness
of the bar and the curiosity of the bench, there may be renewed
with fresh ardour discussion of the much talked about and little
understood problem of the part decided cases play in the living
systems of civil law. The present notes upon some aspects of the
question in the Latin-derived countries may assist toward the
formulation of an answer.
To let the known scale for us the unknown, it will be useful
to glance for a brief moment at what we understand to be the
judging procedure. A judge has before him an actual controversy
between two or more real parties who make conflicting claims as
to the present status or future condition or both of persons or
property. The facts are agreed to, determined with or without
the aid of a jury, or assumed (as on the argument of demurrers
or procedural motions), and the court has to declare what legal
consequences attach to them. The judge whose function it is to
administer the law must find some means of resolving the opposi-
tion between the litigants' to the end that they may step out of
each other's way and resume their normal non-controversial
*Assistant Professor of Latin-American Law, Harvard Law School, 1929-
1932.
**President Wilson, Mobile, Oct. 27, 1913; President F. D. Roosevelt,
Washington, Dec. 28, 1933.
'See Ireland, The Use of Decisions by United States Students of Civil
Law (1934) 8 Tur,. L. REv. - .
2Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1933) 7 TuL. L. REv. 183, 185.
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PRECEDENTS' PLACE IN LATIN LAW
course of life without interfering with the rights of each other
or of strangers or of the communal group of which they tem-
porarily form a part. The steps in thus determining how to ad-
just conflicting claims are finding a rule of law, applying it to
the facts and evolving a decision which settles the future conduct
of the parties with respect to the issue. So far as the judge is
responsive to good repute and wishes to avoid semblance of
arbitrariness, partisanship or ignorance he will wish, as he is
sometimes required, to make public record, save in the simplest
and plainest matters, of the reasons impelling him to come to the
conclusion he adopts. This statement of the judge's reasons for
his decision becomes the opinion in the case: and is finally the
product of one man, whether or not the ideas or actual words of
secretaries, referees, reporters or other judges are incorporated
in it (although in "per curiam" paragraphs we are not told the
author's name). If there is a group who have the responsibility
of deciding, that statement agreed to by all or a majority is the
opinion of the court, and the others according to inclination or
custom may or may not make similar public record of the reasons
which seem to them to compel a different conclusion.
The opinions of the single trial judge in first instance are
subject to a greater range of the natural variants of experience,
skill and intelligence and usually to the practical limitation of
restricted accessibility,' but they differ in weight only and not
in kind from the opinions of the normal appellate tribunal, of
from three to nine members, in second or third instance, in which
a large measure of continuity of thought and action is preserved
under ordinary circumstances by the partial changing of the per-
sonnel, one or two at a time. Thus far, the opinion making pro-
cess may be recognized as identical in common law and civil law
jurisdictions, but we come to the traditional parting of the ways
with the next steps in our inquiry: where and how does the judge
find the rule of law which applied to the facts as stated in the
opinion determines his decision, and what effect does that decision
have beyond the immediate case in which it is rendered? So far
as we find the use of previous decisions involved in the answer
to the first of these questions, it is obvious that we shall have
answered a positive part of the second.
"Reports of inferior courts lower the quality of the law: Seymour, Beported
Cases as .'recedents (1918) 6 Ky. L. J. 112. New York has the Miscellaneous
Reports, New York Supplement and even the daily New York Law Journal,
the opinions in which are clipped and preserved in some offices.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1934], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss2/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Without attempting a discussion of the meanings and merits
of the historical and the free law schools of juristic thought, an
appraisement of the conceptions of Savigny and Jhering or a
philosophical analysis of juridical ontology and teleology, our
practical understanding of the common law system we see around
us is that it rests upon the fundamental working basis that its
authoritative exponents, the judges, find and declare the law from
previous applied instances. In the absence of general statutory
commands and the impossibility of detailed provisions to fit ex-
actly every situation that can arise, common law courts are sup-
posed to apply rules they deduce from precedents nearest in kind
to the issue before them. The decision itself then actually makes,
whether it creates or states, a new rule of law; and it may in its
turn thereafter be used more or less compellingly by those who
know of it to help them to the decision of new issues that present
themselves in the future. The collapse of all conception of law as
a harmonious unit that has been wrought in the last century by
this idea hard at work in half a hundred final tribunals, abetted
by the report publishers' and the digest makers, somewhat shied
off from by our English cousins,' though apparently contemplated
with equanimity by a sturdy old guard,' appears to be invoking
a thickening cloud of criticism, ranging from viewing with alarm"
through pointing with scorn! to the suggestion of some possible
merit in limitation' or even a compromise in extreme cases with
6Winslow, The Courts and the Paper Mills (1915) 10 ItL. L. RLv. 157.
Riddell, C. J. Winslow and the Paper Mills (1915) 10 Ir. L. BEv. 365.
rThe True Value of American Cases (1918) 54 CAN. L. J. (n. s.) 15; 52
IR. L. T. 212.6IMcLoud, Value of Precedents (1894) 28 Am. L. REv. 218; Power of
Precedents (1894) 1 LAw BOOK NEws 289; Gray, Judicial Precedents (1895)
9 HARv. L. REV. 27, 30 Ir. L. T. 21, 58, 98; Salmond, Theory of Judicial
Precedents (1900) 16 LA-v Q. REv. 376; Hall, Do Courts Make Laws? (1917)
51 Amx. L. Rv. 833; Kotze, Judicial Precedent (1917) 34 So. Asu. L. J. 280;
(1918) 144 L. T. 349, 390; Bond of Precedent (1926) 70 SOL. J. 1119.
'Whittaker, The Law of American Precedent (1879) 7 Am. L. BEc. 620;
Garrison, Blind Adherence to Precedents (1917) 51 Am. L. REv. 251; Forsyth,
Fetish of Precedent (1922) 42 CAN. L. T. 182.
"Gumbleton, Erroneous Precedents (1894) 96 L. T. 580, 97 ib. 6, 31.6 Hammond, Precedent and Authority (1897) ORE. BAR Ass'N 142; Jury,
The Misuse of Precedents (1915) 19 LAw NoTEs (N. Y.) 127, 160; Clarke,
What May Be Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present Discontent
with the Administration of Justice (1916) 50 Am. L. RV. 161 (Precedents
should bind only the parties); Kerr, The Ocean of Decision (1923) 96 CENT.
L. J. 241; Allen, Precedent and Logic (1925) 41 LAW Q. REV. 329; Hard-
man, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 163;
Ohlinger, The Power of the Written Assertion (1926) 24 MiCm. L. REv. 120;
Arnold, Stare Decisis vs. Generalizations (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 174;
MeKean, The Bule of Precedents (1928) 76 U. PA. L. BEv. 481.
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reason and justice.' The horrid facts, however, seem still to
accumulate while the bar prepares, and whether or not the
privately supported current process of restatement is going to
lead to an American codification, ' the publication with each text
of complete state annotations is certainly an invitation to start
at once the burial cairn with a hail of attentive decisions. Sum-
moning explanatory conditions of time for reversed cases within
a single jurisdiction, of space for simultaneous inconsistent cases
in different jurisdictions and of non-being for overruled cases,"°
the common law student maintains universally his contention that
decisions make the law."
The civil law system, or that part of it which descends
straightest from the Roman, starts with a collection (code) of
rules to be followed, methods to be observed and ends to be at-
tained, stated wholly without the differentiations of specific facts.
In theory, these generalities are to be applied, in an establishe
hierarchy of imperativeness, by themselves without the interveu-
tion of other instances, to the solution of each problem separately
as it arises. New conditions not before encountered and old
situations seen in new backgrounds, alike are entitled to and will
receive the benefit of a direct testing by and application of the
original general precepts, unaffected by the indications of judges
in the past. We have then to examine this theory in operation,
to note the way it works, what it permits and what it excludes,
and what tendencies it implies.
=.Decline of Precedents (1889) 13 VA. LAw J. 436; 21 OHIO. LEo. NEWS
351; Pennington, From Abstract Principle to Precedent (1915) 22 CASE AND
Comm. 485; Lawrence, Precedent vs. Evolution (1919) 12 MAINE L. REv.
169; Humble, Departing from Precedent (1921) 19 MICH. L. REV. 608;
McCardie, Case Law (1927) 64 L. J. 526, 164 L. T. 464.
uTrumbull, Precedent vs. Justice (1893) 27 Am. L. REV. 321, 95 L. T.
231, 253; Liggett, Precedents vs. Justice (1893) 27 Am. L. REV. 794 (Reply
to preceding).12Casual current examples: Williams, Clogging the Equity of Redemption
(1933) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 31; Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation
on Interstate Railways (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 389.
'3HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SoCIAL SCIENCES, POUND, ch. IX, 1URIS-
PRUDENCE (1925) 444, 478. Franklin, Book Review (1933) 8 TU. L. REV.
149.
"4Miller, Codification (1892) PROC. W. VA. BAR Ass'x 131, 139; Shanton,
The Common Law System of Judicial Precedent Compared with Codification
as a System of Jurisprudence (1918) 23 DICK. L. REv. 37.
7Corrigan, A Final Decision of a Court of Last Resort May Not Ever Be
the Law (1924) 8 M AQ. L. REV. 150. See Town of Weston v. Ralston, 48
W. Va. 170, 36 S. E. 446 (1900); Harbert v. Monongahela R. Co., 50 W. Va.
253, 40 S. E. 377 (1901); Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 41 S. E. 193
(1902).
"Lincoln, The Relation of Judicial Decisions to the Law (1907) 21 HARv.
L. REV. 120.
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The social interest in putting an end to litigation for its own
sake, after all legitimate rights of the interested parties have
been duly afforded the benefit of judicial examination has led to
the establishment of a doctrine (res judicata pro veritate habetur)
known in the common law as res judicata, in the civil law gen-
erally as chose jug~e. In both, when a judgment rendered has
become final, it is conclusive as to the issues necessarily tried and
further legal controversy between the same parties as to the same
subject matter will not be heard; with the differences, unim-
portant for the present consideration, that the common law gen-
erally includes persons claiming through the original parties, and
the civil law requires the cause of action to be the same.'7 This
establishment by the public will of a final determination, with its
thus limited scope, is of course in no way to be confused' 8 with
the common law doctrine of stare decisis, by which precedents
, are held to be binding upon all persons in similar cases.
1 Remembering tales from the past, or perhaps actual abuses
(which it would be fascinating to have a legal historian some day
fully describe), the compilers of the French Civil Code, which is
the starting point for our purposes, thought it necessary ex-
pressly to prohibit their judges from declining to decide a case
before them:--
Art. A. A judge who refuses to render judgment under
pretence that the law is silent, obscure or insufficient may be
prosecuted for the offense of denying justice.
This provision has been copied or imitated in many codes enacted
since the Code Napoleon, though some state merely the prohibition
without the sanction.' It is a favorite subject of general remark
by the Commentators in opening their discussions of the principles
of civil law.
Where in the United States Article 5 of the French Code is
known, with its purpose, among others, of preventing the forma-
tion of a body of precedents which should become binding upon
17 CIvI CODE (Napoleon), France, a. 1351; Belgium, a. 1351.
"Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co., 98 W. Va. 698, 127 S.
E. 644 (1925); Sullivan, What is a Precedent? (Jan. 1923) 11 GEo. L. J. 1.
"Clarke v. Figgins, 27 W. Va. 663 (1886); Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va.
169, 1 S. E. 302 (1886); Pyles v. Furniture Co., 30 W. Va. 123, 2 S. E. 909
(1887).
0CIVM CODE: Belgium, a. 4; France, a. 4; Spain, a. 6; Cuba, a. 6;
Dominican Rep. a. 4; Haiti, a. 9; Panama, a. 2. Philippine Ids., a. 6;
Puerto Rico, a. 7; Quebec, a. 11.
n CIVM CODE: Argentina, a. 15; Brazil, a. 5; Ecuador, a. 18; Guatemala,
a. 17, 18; Mexico, a. 18; Paraguay, a. 15; Peru, a. 8, 9; Uruguay, a. 15.
Code of Civil Procedure, Nicaragua, a. 443, pr.
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the courts,' it is rather the fashion, remembering the great French
reports series' to declare, with eminent authority,' that the pre-
vention has failed, and that decided cases have become just as
important under the Code Napol6on as they are in the common law
system.' We may inquire what the French jurists themselves say
as to this. A Professor of the Faculty of Law of Paris recently
wrote:-
"The time is past when one discussed the value of juris-
prudence as a source of positive law, and no professor of the
Faculty would permit himself to-day to oppose his personal
doctrine to the decisions of the Court of Cassation",
to which a colleague, the Dean at Lyon, replies:-
"We very much fear that one can see in this optimistic
declaration only the expression of a wish rather than the
statement of a reality. It is true, the divorce which formerly
existed between doctrine and jurisprudence and which was
vigorously denounced by A. Esmein " seems to have weakened,
thanks to a more just comprehension of juridical reality;
but behold what arduous problems of responsibility a hard
and persistent test imposes upon this so necessary and fruit-
ful entente cordiale.'
The Commentators and teachers of law have agreed that juris-
prudence is important, helpful as illustrating how general state-
ments are applied and gaps filled in the law, but
"Whatever authority may attach to it, even when it is
constant on a given point of law, it never forms a rule
juridically obligatory upon the citizens or the courts .....
It is the judge's duty not to let himself be halted by
precedents of which doctrine or experience has demonstrated
to him the error or the inconvenience"; "'
uWRGHT, TRANS. FRENoH Civm CoDE (1908), a. 5; (1932) 7 Tul. L. Rev.
100, n. 2.
mPANDECTES FRANCAISES (1886-1905) vols. 1-59, and volumes on special
subjects; DALLoz, REP. DE LEG., DocmR. ET Junispn. (1845-1860), vols. 1-44
and Annuals since; Sit, REcuRI GENERAL (1831 to date), vols. 1-9 and
Annuals.2
'Pound, Courts and Legislation (1913) 7 Air. POL. Sor. REV. 361, 366.
sDeak, The .Place of the "Case" in the Common and the Civil Law (1934)
8 Trm. L. REV. -.
mRIPERT, REOUEM DES SOMMAIRES, TABLE QUIN. (1929) Preface.
'Esmein, La Jurisprudence et la Doctrine (1902) I REv. TRIM. DR. CIv.
1. (Citation Teference ours).
Josserand, La Doctrine contre 6a Jurisprudence (1931) DALoz Jun. GEN.
D. H. 69.
9 1 AuB Y E RAU, Couns DR. Civ. FR. (Se ed. 1897) § 39 bis.
6
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"The authority (of jurisprudence) can be, we think,
only a simple authority of reason .... and we should not
consider jurisprudence as a formal source of law ..... The
judge cannot give the motive for his decision simply in a
reference to a previous decision, for that would lend to the
earlier decision the authority of a general regulatory dis-
position";
and
"The judge remains free to adopt another principle of
solution in analogous cases which may come before him in
the future".'
In France it seems evident that no one has the idea, in run-
ning down, citing and discussing previous decisions that he is
presenting to the judge authority which the instant decision must
follow or be reversed on appeal. The previous cases on both
sides are examples of logical reasoning applied to more or less
similar circumstances by other trained minds; and though the
conclusion reached by the judge will seem to one lawyer to be
like that in the cases he produced, the other can make no effective
complaint and take no appeal simply on the ground that the
decision is unlike his set of cases: it did not fail to follow and is
not contrary to them, but is at most different from and wholly
competent to disregard them. Although great, perhaps increas-
ing, respect is paid in France to decided cases,' it is accepted
that neither a decision nor a course of decision can lay down a
general rule.' In a line of cases proceeding from similar causes,
the later ones tend inevitably to model themselves on the ones that
have gone before,' and after a time the jurisprudence seems to
be fixed upon the question; but there is nothing obligatory, the
course of progress may be changed and the rule is not certain
"I 1 BAUDRY-LAcANTnqERiE, TRAiTE TiEOn. PRAT. Dr. Civ. (2e ed. 1902)
§§ 233-250.
nq1 BAUDRY-LAcANTINERIE, PRECIS DR. Civ. (12e ed. 1919) §§ 87-92. See
also LAURENT, PRIN. DR. CIV. FR. (3e ed. 1878) §§ 258-260, 264-267; GAVET,
SOURCES DE L'HiSTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS (1899) 443-445; 2 GENY, METHODE
D'INTERPRETATION (2e ed. 1919) §§ 145-150; OAPITANT, INTROD. A L'ETUDE
DU DR (5e ed. 1929) a. 5. Levy-Ullman, Note (1901) S=B REc. GEN.
2.225, at 231.
'Amos, The Code Napoleon and the Modern World (1928) 10 J. Comp.
LEG. (3rd Ser.) 222.
" Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 641,
649.
'So that lawyers fatuously "count on the natural indolence of men for
servile repetition of the decision rendered". RIPERT, op. cit. supra, n. 26.
7
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until it has been fixed in a statutory text.' In Louisiana and
Quebec," which derive their civil codes from the French model
but are now under common law appeal jurisdictions, the tendency
is naturally toward assimilation of the superior technique; and
citations are used with increasing frequency and precedents begin
to acquire a certain compulsory effect.
The common law student, who is discontented with the law
"in vaeuo" which he gets by reading what is said upon
imagined situations by authors in the seclusion of studies or
libraries and must satisfy his desire to see the law in action by
reading what is said upon presented situations by hurried authors
in chambers or on the bench, will welcome here several applied
instances. As might be expected, suspension (adjournment) of
all proceedings in a case for a definite time is not a violation of
Article 5,' but the court must not refuse a decision on damages
on the ground that the evidence (experts' report) does not per-
mit calculation of the exact amount," nor return the parties to
an appeal court because a modifying decree the lower court
should apply is thought or said to contain obscure provisions."
Cases of attempted or successful prosecution of any judge under
Article 5 appear to be lacking.
Having thus endeavored to ensure that a judge shall act as
judge, Napoleon's Commission were next concerned with seeing
that he did not act as legislator. The principle of the separation
of powers, often given lip service in England and the United
States, has been a practical ideal elsewhere, and lent effective sup-
81 Corx ET CAPrrANT. DR. CIV. FR. (7e ed. 1931) § 26. Cf. Gutteridgo,
A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statute Law (1933) 8 Tim.
L. REV. 1, 16.
"It should be noted that Louisiana, for the French origin of her code
and her institutions habitually pointed at as the odd one in the family, ap-
pears to grow ever more like her sisters, despite the accepted aim of Con-
stitution (1921) Art. IM, Section 18, and its eight predecessors. Her crim-
inal law has long been based on the common law; her tort law is to-day
substantially "a body of common law rules and principles" (8 Tui. L. REV.
53, n. 3); her law students enthusiastically reflect and replenish the efforts
of her bar toward common law modes; and the opinions of her courts are
written in established common law fashion. See Davidson, Stare Deosis in
Louisiana (1932) 7 TuL. L. REv. 100.
O"Mignault, The Authority of Decided Cases (1925) 3 CAN. BAR REV. 1.
Kennedy, The Law of Quebec (1932) 1 So. AF. L. T. 196; (1932) 7 Tim.
L. REV. 108, n. 46.
"Grimoult c. syndic Marchand (Nov. 28, 1855) Cass. Req., Dalloz Jur.
Gen. 1856. 1.56.
"Cass. Civ. (Feb. 4, 1920), Dalloz 1924.1.62.
" alloz, Deni de Justice (Aug. 16, 1813) Cass. Civ. Agen.
8
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port in the constitution and the laws of France and countries
copying parts of her system. The codifiers provided that
Art. B. Judges are forbidden to decide cases submitted
to them by laying down general rules of conduct or accord-
ing to settled decisions. '
M. Portalis, supporting the Project of the Code,' declared that
the judge ought to comprehend the spirit of the legislation, but
not himself participate in the exercise of the legislative power;
and efforts to preserve the distinction have been the concern of
many civil law legislators since that time. Legislation, it is
pointed out, properly looks to the future and binds all persons
(Nwithin the jurisdiction of the enacting body) ; a decision is con-
cerned with the past, and affects only the parties (or those claim-
ing under them): the law should be general (de his quae semel
aut bis accidunt non cavent legislatores) but the decision must be
limited to the particular case,' and so far as it attempts or turns
out to be regulatory and universal, it infringes upon the legis-
lative power. So, some codes have been even more explicit:-
Art. C. It is for the legislator alone to explain or inter-
pret the law in a manner generally obligatory. Judicial
sentences have no obligatory force except in the causes in
which they are pronounced."
Allied to the separation of powers, there may be noted a
theory which has gained some support in France of the possibility
of classifying judgments as declarative or constitutive. The dis-
tinction may have descended from the double faculty of the
praetor"' in later Roman law to judge (jurisdictio) and to decree
(imperium). Merlin, protagonist of the modern discussion, thinks
a judgment is declarative when it recognizes the existence of an
anterior right which has been contested, and constitutive when
it creates new rights. Thus, judgments in suits for breach of con-
tract are declarative, while one of divorce, filiation or bankruptcy
1CIvIL CODE: Belgium, a. 5; Prance, a. 5; Colombia, a. 17; Dominican
Rep., a. 5; Haiti, a. 8.
,'LocRE, LA LEGISLATION DE LA FRANCE (1836) Vol. I, p. 156. Cf. (1932)
6 TU L L. REV. 610, n. 97.
E. g., Spain, In re Mendizabal (Dec. 1, 1889), No. 400, 42 Turis. Adm.
570; No. 401, Col. Leg. Cons. Est. 1598. Cf. Partida 7, Title 34, Rule 36.
"CIVIL CODE: Chile, a. 3; Ecuador, a. 3; *Uruguay, a. 12. First sentence
only: Honduras, a. 3; Salvador, a. 3. Second sentence only: Colombia, a. 17.
"Stammler, Legislation and Judicial Decision (1925) 23 MOH. L. REV.
362.
9
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is constitutive. But, as M:. Mazeaud' points out, a judgment of
either class has in it something of the characteristics of the other:
the award of damages creates by delegation of the public power
a right not before existing, the right to execution (jurisdictio sine
modica coercitione nulla est) ; and the decree of divorce recognizes
preexisting marital rights as the basis at least for the new juridical
situation which it establishes. It seems probable, indeed, that
every judgment would on analysis be found to contain elements
of both classes, so far as they can be defined and understood.; and
the attempted distinction does not so much itself enlighten us as
it seems to suggest a possible division among judgments which
will, if valid, help materially to answer the question as to what
part decisions take in making civil law.
In the beginning of any society, the judging function, though
exercised by the chief or ruler was, we may suppose, a matter of
deciding disputes that had arisen between two or more individuals,
and concerned itself with settling the rights between them to land
or personal property or the exercise of subordinate power, leaving
for a different occasion operation of the functions of the ruler
we should to-day generally call administrative and legislative.
Even after the judging power had been delegated regularly to
other persons, there remained the possibility that it might in any
given case be recalled and exercised by the ruler, as old enact-
ments show.' Looking back, now, from the divergent principles
of the two modern systems, it appears that in the common law the
decisions of the judges began to be taken and finally came to be
considered as conclusive, for the determination of new cases aris-
ing, while in the civil law each decision became a closed episode
of the cause which elicited it and rules for new cases were left
to legislative creation. As this difference in habit became fixed
in the repetition of usage and custom until it became a rule, by
the collective will of the state, whether innately in the sovereign
or implicitly delegated by the people, it gave actually separate
qualities to judgments under the two systems. In the common
4Mazeaud, Do la Distinction des Jugements Declaratifs et des Jugements
Constitutifs do Droits (1929) 28 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 17; reprinted without
the notes, (Chile, 1929) 26 REv. DER. JuR. Y CIEY. Soo. 120. See also
MoNTAGNE, DE L'EFFET DECLARATIF OU CONSTITUTIF DES JUGEMENTS EN MATIERS
orviLE (Paris, 1912) these; ESuEiN, DES EFFETS DES DECISIONS DE JUSTIOE
SUR LA RECONNAISSANCE ET LA CREATION DES DROITS (Paris, 1914), these.
'"Spain (1265) Partida 3, Title 22, Law 11; Part. 3, Title 23, Law 15.2;
Part. 7, Title 33, Law 4; (1805) Nov. Recop., Lib. 3, Title 2, Law 3. So,
to-day, the Pope: see Ireland, The State of the City of the Yatican (1933)
27 Aum. J. IT. LAw 283.
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law each decision carried a degree of connective relation with
similar ones past and future which with respect to the whole con-
tent of the law we may call conductivity; while in the civil law
the decision remained a single instance of applied legislation in a
condition which resembled insulation.
These separate qualities persist in the store of jurisprudence
of both systems, and definitely condition the uses made of it: the
conductive decisions of the common law are absorbed in the legis-
lative mass and become homogeneous and necessary parts of the
structure; the insulated decisions of the civil law remain distinct
in substance from the mass, on the surfaces of the legislative
material, and may fall off and be replaced by like or unlike with-
out effect upon the general structure. In this interpretation, in
accord with the known facts, it is obvious that the civil law
student, practitioner or judge may seek, examine and discuss
precedents freely: he can never find in them a rule of law, nor be
led by them alone to any decision. He must reason, as logically
as he can, to his conclusion for himself from the legislative law
given him; and at most he will be gratified to find that another
mind from similar premises has independently arrived at the
same conclusion. The civil law judge, moreover, makes this in-
sulation most apparent in the casual, toneless way he inserts with-
out comment the bald statement of the places where may be found
the decisions he cites as illustrations along the course of his
opinion.
Of special interest is legislation which expressly refers the
judge, in the absence of applicable statutory enactment, to juris-
prudence: a method of shorthand adoption by the legislators of a
body of law which has the twofold advantage of making unneces-
sary any legislative attempt to draft or formulate its rules and of
leaving them fluidly susceptible of change to suit altered condi-
tions or include new applications without recourse to the slow
process of legislative amendment. The recent Swiss Civil Code
begins:-
The Code governs all matters covered by the letter or
the spirit of any of its provisions. In the absence of an
applicable legal provision, the judge shall decide according to
customary law, and in the absence of any custom, according
to the rules which he would establish if he had to act as legis-
11
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lator. He may inspire his decision by solutions sanctioned
by doctrine and jurisprudence.'
This article appears to contemplate for the limited number of
cases in which the courts find no applicable legal provision in the
statute law" the creation of suitable rules from custom or what
the judge would provide if he were legislating, guided by solu-
tions drawn first (as is often overlooked by common law com-
mentators on this section) from the jurisconsults and text-writers
(doctrine) and only second from decided cases (jurisprudence).
In this order, the novelty of this enactment in European practice
really lies more in its failure primarily to invoke analogy' than
in' its final reference to jurisprudence. Incorporation by reference
of custom' as controlling when no positive written provision is
to be found is not new, in either hemisphere, and the general
principles of law quite commonly made the last resoie are nor-
mally looked for first in the text-writers and then in the cases.
Since the going into effect in 1912 of this new Swiss Code, the
highest Federal Court has not hesitated, in the very small per-
centage of appeals in which a gap in the written law appears to
have been found, to approve its being filled according to the
analogy of rules in similar cases,' according to customary usage,"
what the judge would do if he were legislatinge and without any
" CIvIL CODE, Switzerland (1907) Introduction, a. 1. Texts: (1931) 5
TuL. L. REV. 270, n. 28; (1932) 6 TuL. L. REV. 402, n. 121. Comment:
WILLmS, THE SouRcEs 0 LAW nfl THE SWISS CIVIL CODE (1923); Martin,
Observations, etc. (1901) 23 SEM. JUD. 1; CHAUDE, NOUVEAU CODE
SUISSE; Schuster, The Swiss Civil Code (1923) 5 J. CouP. LEG. (3rd Ser.)
216; Sperl, Case Law and the European Codified Law (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV.
505, 5 Ams. L. S. REV. 514; COSENTMI, COD. Civ. Px-AERE. (1932) 9, 22,
57, a. 20.
The text of the final sentence appears diverse in the trilingual original:-
Er fo]gt dabei bewahrter Lehre und Ueberlieferung
]a s'inspire des solutions consacrees par ]a doctrine et ]a jurisprudence
Egli si attiene alla dottrina ed alla giurisprudenza piu autorevoli.
"In the civil law generally it has been asserted by a judge that "1999
of the cases are decided within the Codes." Henry (1929) 15 A. B. A.
J. 11.
"Discussed under Art. D, infra, n. 76.
"Discussed under Art. H, infra n. 89.
"Discussed under Art. E, infra n. 78.
"3Mathis c. Obergericht de Zurich (1924) 72 Jour. Trib. 1.130; Masse de
]a Banque c. Kalin-Benziges (1925) 73 Jour. Trib. 1.2; Ass'n de Bienne c.
Henzi (1926) 74 Jour. Trib. 1.98.
Schauffelberger c. Milz (1922) 70 Jour. Trib. 1.468; Amrhyn-Notzli c.
Chambre du Tessin (1924) 72 Jour. Trib. 1.562; Luscher c. Dr. Lusecher
(1928) 76 Jour. Trib. 1.354.
mHelvetia c. Pera (1921) 69 Jour. Trib. 1.272.
12
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mention of authority,' but in no instance which has been found7
according to a rule derived from any previous decision; so that
the revolutionary movement toward the common law system of
precedents anticipated in some quarters from this article appears
not yet in evidence.
Mexco in the latest form of its Constitutional Protection
(Amparo) Law also establishes jurisprudence as a source of law,
in providing that :-
The judgments of the Supreme Court voted by a majority
of seven or more of its members shall constitute jurisprudence,
provided the decision is found in five cases not interrupted by
any contrary one.
The jurisprudence of the Court in amparo cases is
obligatory upon District (Federal) Judges. The Supreme
Court shall respect its own decisions. It may, nevertheless,
alter the established jurisprudence; but in such cases always
expressing the reasons for so deciding. These reasons should
refer to those which were considered in establishing the juris-
prudence now changed.'
Thus a determination that is followed without contradiction the
required number of times (cf. legislation, such as in several
States a proposal for a constitutional amendment, which has to
be passed by successive legislatures before taking effect) hardens
into a rule of law, which the lower courts must follow' and the
Supreme Court will respect, but may still change when it finds
sufficient reason for so doing.' The public authority in this legis-
rLombardi c. Confed. Suisse (1921) 69 Jour. Trib. 1.226; Bucher c.
Lisibach (1923) 71 Jour. Trib. I 304; Deutsche Evap., S. A. c. Bamberger,
Leroi & Cie. (1924) 72 Jour. Trib. 1.19; B. c. A. (1925) 73 Jour. Trib.
1.290; Gaudenzi c. Gaudenzi (1925) 73 Jour. Trib. 1.354; Weber, Huber et
Cie. c. Rimba (1932) 80 Jour. Trib. 1.456.
17In (1912-1932) Vols. 60-80, inc., Jour. Trib. In a case governed by a
statutory clause, the Court rejected as not sanctioned a previous decision
cited to them: Gasser-Keller c. Met. Hallau (1926) 74 Jour. Trib. 1.539.
To same effect: Costa Rica, Barquero c. Montoya (July 17, 1931) Corte Cas.
11.36; Cuba, Madan c. Capo, 1910 Juris. Trib. Supr. Civ. 145.
OFEDErAL CODE oF Cnvm PROCEDURE (1908), a. 786, 787; Amparo Law(1919) a. 148, 149. Not contained in previous enactments: Constitution(1857) a. 101, 102; (1917) a. 103, ]07; AmPARo LAw (Nov. 30, 1861) No.
5478, 9 LEo. MEX. 328; (Jan. 20, 1869) No. 6515, 10 LEG. M X. 521; (Dec.
14, 1882) No. 184, 39 REC0P. LEYEs. DEER. z Paov. 510. Flores, The Writ
of Amparo under Mexican Law (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 388; Schuster (1933)
7 TuL. L. REV. 353, n. 74. Of. A'mparo Law, Nicaragua (1911) 5 BoL.
JuD. 1673.
Cia. de Com. Inv. e Ind. S. A. c. Tes. Gen. (Feb. 10, 1927) 20 Sem. Jud.
5a ep. 355; Balanza c. Trib. Supr. del D. F. (1929) 23 Sem. Jud. 5a ep.
652; Quesada c. Lodoza (Jan. 11, 1930) 28 Sem. Jud. 5a ep. 149.
IOCortina c. Gobernador et als. (Jan. 27, 1930) 28 Sem. Jud. 5a ep. 443.
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lation, the Court finds, departs a little from the theory of the
(civil) law that a decision is applicable only to the case in which
it was rendered, in making the resolutive part of the judgments,
sufficiently repeated, a rule of conduct for future cases; but pre-
serves so much of that theory as makes the jurisprudence
applicable only to the same class of case as that in which the
precedent was formed, and this enactment does not adopt the
very dangerous system of judicial construction by which the
theoretical principle of one law is employed to interpret other
laws.' Nicaragua in civil matters requires its judges to consider
the doctrines of law accepted by the jurisprudence of the courts
and the most authorized opinions upheld by interpreters or ex-
positors of the law;' and Uruguay refers to the doctrines most
received.'
The idea that numbers may effect a technical alteration in the
binding quality of decisions has been applied in a limited way to
different ends elsewhere in Spanish derived law. The legislature
in Colombia enacted that three uniform decisions in cassation by
the Supreme Court on the same point of law should constitute
the most probable legal doctrine ;" while in Costa Rica the courts
themselves have determined that three decisions make constant
jurisprudence for certain purposes.' In Spain, "infraction of the
law or of legal doctrine" is one of the grounds upon which an
appeal may be based; and for a time" the courts observed a rule
of their own creation, perhaps originating as a protection against
a mass of meritless appeals, that one single decision did not estab-
lish a legal doctrine whose infraction would come within this
ground. Later the rule was abandoned in Spain, but meanwhile
it had been adopted in Cuba," where it is still sometimes invoked,
"IMin. Pub. c. N. E. Fuel Oil Co., S. A. (Aug. 1, 1929) 26 Sem. Jud. 5a
ep. 1874, 1894. And see Sue. de Pena c. Presidente et als. (Feb. 28, 1930)
28 Sem. Jud. 5a ep. 1183.
2CODE OP Civm PROCEDURE (1905) a. 443, subds. 2 and 4.
"CIvIL CODE, a. 16.
"Law No. 153 of 1887, a. 10, 12.
'Purves v. Villalobos (Sept. 4, 1931) Corte Cas. 31.251; Estrada v. Rey
(Nov. 26, 1931) Corte Cas. 631.
'Begun by Codina c. Codina (June 30, 1866) No. 290, 14 Jur. Civ. Rev.
Gen. 237; No. 291 COL. LEG. 1866. 1.1120. Domingo Rivera (1870) 36 Rev.
Gen. Leg. y Jur. 358. Probably abandoned by 1883.
" Macicior c. Serrano (Oct. 7, 1905), No. 81, 28 Jur. Trib. Supr. 20 at 31.
Latest: F. C. U. Habana c. See. de Hac. (Feb. 28, 1933), No. 63, 1933 Jur.
al Dia, Cont.-Adm. 72. Of. Solorzano c. Tabernilla y Sobrino (1905), 26
Jur. Trib. Supr. 78 at 81; and 26 b. 621. But a single sentence is obligatory
on lower courts: Echeverria c. Rouco (Nov. 30, 1908), No. 87, 1908 Trib.
Supr. Civ. 368. Cf. Deer. Pres. No. 203 (Feb. 10, 1914), 43 COL. LEG. 225.
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notwithstanding vigorous protests against it.' Aside from these
special instances, Spanish speaking jurists are unanimous in say-
ing that even if jurisprudence ought to be,' ° it definitely is not
a source of law,' but at most evidence of the law,' and so the
courts hold.' In some jurisdictions the legislature has recognized
that the courts in practice may meet problems which existing
statutes will not solve, and have provided for official consultations
from the lower judge, after deciding the case in hand, to the
Supreme Court to obtain a certain rule for new cases which may
occur,' in a sort of cross between an appeal de oficio and an ad-
visory opinion; and have shown the purpose to keep the final
making of new rules in the hands of the legislative power by re-
quiring the transmission of such consultations with their report
thereon by the Supreme Court to the legislature."
Any given law, whether code or special act, involved in a
case may be ambiguous or doubtful in its expressed language or
it may be entirely lacking in provisions applicable to the points
at issue. In the former case the law requires interpretation; and
the civil law no less than the common law has rules therefor. The
Cruz, NVote (1925) JuRis. A.L Di, Civ. 403.
'Spain: FUcoN, COD. Crv. Esp. ILuST. (1888), 1.33; Scaevola, COD. CIV.
ComENT. (3a ed. 1893), 1.132; ROBLES POZO, COD. CIV. Y SU JURISPR. COME1Ne.
(1896) 1.101; NAVARRO, ComENT. COD. Civ. Esp. (5a ed. 1924), 1.84. A.rgentina:
MAonADo, COD. Crv. ARG. (1922) 1.50. Cuba: Cruz, Note (1926) JuRis. AL
DIA, Civ. 365.
'0Spain, Serna (1868) 33 REV. GEN. LEG. Y Jur. 258; DIEGo, DisOUnso
INAUGURAL (1925) No. 70, REAL ACAD. DE Jur Y LEG. 127 f.; VALVERDE,
TRAT. DER. Civ. Esp. (3a ed. 1925) 1.171 ff. Argentina, Gonnet (1924) 12
JuR. ARG. Y LEO., SEC. Door. 49; Calzada (1926) 1 AN. FAc. Sai. Jur. 49;
LLERWA, COD. Civ. ARa. (3a ed. 1931) 1.63. Brazil, Miranda, DOUrnrir E
Junis. (1931) 2 Rev. Esrim. JuR. E Soc. 32. Panama, CERVERA, JURis. CORTE
SupR. (1921) Pref. i; GARC A, COD. Crv. (1927) 10, n. 1; HERRERA L., Junis.
CORTE SuPn. (Ckiari, 1924) Pref. II.viii. Peru, LAmA, COD. CIV. (1920)
511. Uruguay, GumTO, Co -rnn. COD. Civ. (1896) 47; F. Capella y Pons
(1897) 4 REV. DER. JuR. Y ADm. 18; Amezaga, Orientaciones para la reforma
del Cod. Civ. (1930) 32 REV. DER. JUR. Y ADm. 387; MENDEz, LA JURIS-
PrUDENCIA C0O0 FUENTE DEL DEREOEO (1929).
'V. M. V., JTdiclal Trecedent in llfexian Law (1926) 25 McH. L. REV.
62.
12Spain, Bachiller c. Sandoval (June 23, 1868) No. 176, Sent. Trib. Supr.
1868.L794; No. 177, 18 Jur. Civ. Rev. Gen. 81. Panama, Rep. c. Mendoza
(Nov. 19, 1910), 8 Reg. Jud. 886. Uruguay, M. B. c. Ene. Reg. Gen. (Apr.
30, 1906) 12 Rev. Der. Jur. y Adm. 325. Venezuela, Aristimuno c. Esteves
(Nov. 6, 1931) 21 Rev. Der. y Leg. 57; No. 30, 1932 Mem. de la Corte Fed.
y de Cas. 318 (4 to 3 decision, dissent adhering to "existing antecedent-"
case).
CiVm CODE: Guatemala, a. 18. Cf. Spain, Partida 3, Title 22, Law 11.
Crvm CODE: Ecuador, a. 19; Peru, a. 9, 10. And see Brazil, Miranda,
op. cit. supra, n. 70, at p. 32.
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interpretation7 may be (a) authentic, by the legislator himself,
ascertainable by examination of the full legislative record of the
enactment, a method pursued much further, in proper case, in
a civil law court than is allowed in the anglo-system; (b) doctrinal,
by commentators, jurisconsults and text-writers, whose views are
deemed worthy of attention and given much weight in a civil law
decision; or (c) judicial, by the court in the instant case. Judicial
interpretation of the law, when the preceding sources seem not to
settle the matter, and judicial amplification of the law, when
appropriate express provisions are lacking, may be definitely
directed:-
Art. D. When a controversy cannot be decided by a
precise disposition of law it shall be determined according
to the dispositions regarding analogous cases;
and if it still remains doubtful,
Art. E. According to the general principles of law,'
with regard to the circumstances of the case."
Unlike the Swiss court which, although the new Civil Code makes
no mention of using analogous cases, has as we have seen ° not
hesitated to apply analogy, the Spanish courts have refrained
from reverting openly to a method of interpretation their code
does not authorize,' but where Latin American codes do refer to
7 CrvnW CODE: Colombia, a. 25, 26; France, DEMOLOMBE, COUDS DE CODE NAP.
(4e ed. 1869), § § 109-113; Chile, Univ., Explic. de Cod. Civ. (1882) 23 f.; Peru,
LA .A, COD. Civ. (1920) 507; Uruguay, Gu~mo, COMENT. DEL Con. CIV.
(1896) 1.47.
76CIVn. CODE: Italy, a. 3; Portugal, a. 16; Argentina, a. 16 (civil cases);
Brazil, a. 7; Guatemala, a. 18 (after, the spirit of the law); Nicaragua, a.
17; Panama, a. 13; Paragauy, a. 16 (civil cases); Peru, a. 9 (after, the
spirit of the law); Uruguay, a. 16 (after, the spirit of the law); Venezuela,
a. 4. CODE OF Crvm PROC., Nicaragua, a. 443, subd. 1. Louisiana, a. 17;
(1931) 5 TUL. L. REv. 270 n. 27, 663 n. 27; (1933) 7 TuL. L. REV. 261, 592
n. 45, 638.
- CIvm CODE: Italy, a. 3; Portugal, a. 16 (natural law); Spain, a. 6 (after,
local custom, not analogous cases); Argentina, a. 16; Brazil, a. 7; Cuba,
a. 6 (after, local custom, not analogous cases); Guatemala, a. 18; Mexico,
a. 19 (after, letter of the law or juridical interpretation, not analogous
cases); Nicaragua, a. 17; Panama, a. 13 (after, constitutional doctrine);
Paraguay, a. 16; Peru, a. 9; Uruguay, a. 16; Venezuela, a. 4; Louisiana, a.
21 (natural law); Philippine Ids., a. 6 (after, local custom, not analogous
cases); Puerto Rico, a. 7 (as embodied in equity). Code of Civil Proc.,
Nicaragua, a. 443, subd. 3 (after, doctrine accepted by jurisprudence).
"ClIM CODE: Portugal, a. 16; Argentina, a. 16; Nicaragua, a. 17; Para-
guay, a. 16; Uruguay, a. 16.
See n. 53, supra.
IOn re Mendizabal, supra n. 43. Cf. Spain, Partida 7, Title 34, Rule 36.
Peru, in re Inchaustegui (Sept. 5, 1933) 3 Rev. Tribs. 277. Uruguay, P.
Capella y Pons (1897) 4 Rev. Defr. Jur. y Adm. 18.
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analogy, usually first to be consulted, the courts have no difficulty
in applying it.' Reference originally or next to the general
principles of law is more frequent, and the courts declare relevant
some more or less trite elementary maxim and apply it' without
much attempt to define what principles in general are meant.'
What does appear unanimously from the reports, however, is that
in none of these cases is there made or does it appear that it
occurred to the court that there could be made reference to a
previous decision or line of decisions as determining the analogy
or establishing a general principle of law; so that neither of these
provisions serves to indicate any binding character in juris-
prudence.
Complementary to the question of creating laws is the ques-
tion of ending them; and in that problem also the civil law lays
down rules for its judges. It may say that
Art. F. Laws are repealed only by other later laws,6'
or merely that
Laws may be repealed by other laws.'
Whether the ban on other methods of repeal be express or implied,
the courts do not seem anywhere to have assumed that they could
put an end to a law, except unader the American theory as to laws
contrary to the constitution of the state, and then only when
power to declare the unconstitutionality and consequent nullity
of a legislative enactment is expressly given them by the constitu-
tion and a corresponding procedural statute. Decisions in such
cases affect only the law attacked,' as usually in the United States,
" Argentina, Puesteros c. Lagos (June 10, 1877) 17 Fallos Supr. Ct, 12a
Ser. 8.453; (1918) 2 Jur. Arg. y Leg. 761; (1920) 4 ib. 125, 5 b. 253;
(1922) 9 ib. 53, 883. Panama, Levy c. Goytia (Apr. 24, 1919) 16 Reg. Jud.
430.
2Spain, Navarro c. Almagro (Oct. 31, 1914) No. 120, 49 Col. Leg Civ.
591, 131 Jur. Civ. 591; Lopez c. Cia. Union Elec. Madr. (Apr. 30, 1923) No.
42, 77 Col. Leg. Civ. 220, 159 Jur. Civ. 220. Argentina (1918) 2 Jur. Arg.
y Leg. 604, (1920) 4 b. 28. Cuba, Socarras c. Castillo (1910) 1910 Jur.
Trib. Supr. Civ. 49.
nfDiokno, What are "Zos Principios Generales del Derecho" in Art. 6 of
the Spanish Civil Code? (1930) 10 PHrm. L. J. 1. LAmA, COD. CIV. (Peru, 5a
ed. 1920) 512, lists 82 maxims he thinks are general principles; and Robles
Pozo, op. cit. supra n. 69, at p. 103, lists 48.
"CivM CODE: Italy, a. 5; Spain, a. 5; Argentina, a. 17; Brazil, a. 4; Cuba,
a. 5; Guatemala, a. 11; Haiti, a. 3; Paraguay, a. 17; Uruguay, a. 9;
Venezuela, a. 7; Philippine Ids., a. 5; Puerto Rico, a. 5.
"CM CODE: Chile, a. 52; Colombia, a. 71; Costa Rico, a. 12; Ecuador,
a. 47; Honduras, a. 42; Mexico, a. 9; Salvador, a. 52; Louisiana, a. 22.
"Argentina, Tonazzi y Cia. c. Purt (1922) 9 Jur. Arg. y Leg. 626. Brazil,
Uniao Fed. c. Lima (Nov. 19, 1921) No. 3062, 36 Rev. Supr. Trib. 52, Jose
17
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and sometimes even, according to the implementation, only in the
actual case heard;' and in any event form no body of general
precedent.
It is often prescribed that
Art. G. Against the observance of the'law there may not
be alleged disuse, custom or contrary practice,'
and perhaps further specifically that
Art. H. Custom does not constitute law except when it
is referred to in the statute.'
In determining what may be allowed to control under these pro-
visions, the courts seem not to have attempted to include previous
decisions either as custom °' or as contrary practice.
It appears then to be the theory of the Roman civil law
countries that the judge should always base his decision upon
some legislative provision; and where such provision is lacking,
he may consult analogous provisions, doctrine and jurisprudence,
in that order. The jurisprudence is in no event binding upon him,
but illustrative and to be used merely as an example of similar
premises leading to a similar conclusion, and neither seeks nor is
Maria MacIowell, 0 art. 15 da Const. (1925) 9 Rev. Dir. Pub. 329. Costa
Rica, (1915) 10 El Foro 321. Cuba, Law of Mar. 31, 1903, Juris. al Din,
Inconst'd, passim; Mexico, Amparo Law, supra n. 59-61. Paraguay, Cabriza
c. Estado (Mar. 5, 1919) 2 Bol. Tribs. No. 2, p. 3. Lacking power: Ecuador,
In re Irigoyen (1913) 12 Gac. Jud. 3a Ser. 1234.
'7 Bolivia, Jose Maria Valda, Pres. Supr. Cte. (Jan. 5, 1903) Gac. Jud.
Num. Ext. iii.
'0 CIVnL CODE: Portugal, a. 9 (disuse only); Spain, a. 5 (from Nov. Recop.
Lib. 3, Title 2, Laws 3 and 11); Argentina, a. 17; Colombia, a. 8 (disuse
only); Costa Rica, a. 12; Cuba, a. 5; Guatemala, a. 6; Mexico, a. 10; Peru,
a. 6 (disuse and custom only); Uruguay, a. 9; Venezuela, a. 7; Philippine
Ids., a. 5; Puerto Rico, a. 5. Cf. (1932) 7 TuL. L. REv. 102, n. 12.
9CIVM CODE: Argentina, a. 17; Chile, a. 2; Ecuador, a. 2; Honduras, a.
2; Paraguay, a. 17; Salvador, a. 3; Uruguay, a. 9. Cf. Spain, Partida 7,
Title 33, Law 4. Civir CODE, Panama, a. 13 (in conformity with Christian
morals). Examples are Crvm CODE: Spain, a. 1287, Cuba, a. 1287; Honduras(former, 1898) a. 6; Uruguay, a. 594; Louisiana, a. 1903, 1953, 2716;
Philippine Ids., a. 1287; Puerto Rico, a. 1254; Quebec, a. 1016; Colombia,
Law No. 153 of 1887, a. 13; Louisiana, Act No. 64 of 1904 (N. I. L.), §
196 (law merchant); Act 221 of 1908 (Warehouse Rcpts.) § 56 (law mer-
chant) W. Va. Acts 1907, c. 81 (N. I. L.) § 196 (law merchant); Acts of
1917, c. 8 (Warehouse Rcpts.), § 56 (law merchant).
Argentina (1921) 6 Jur. Arg. y Leg. 329; (1922), 9 b. 759. Costa
Rica, Benedictis v. Marmocchi y Bianchini (May 22, 1896), Corte Cas. 163;
Luis Barquero M. (1907), 3 El Foro 317; Cuba, Plasencia c. Izquierdo (3903),
18 Jur. Trib. Supr. 332; Peru, CALLE, COD. Civ. ANOT. (1928) 10. Louisiana,
Suce. of Dunn (1927), 6 La. App. 663. Cf. Panama, Rep. c. Urrutia (Mar.
3, 1904) 1 Reg. Jud. 176. Switzerland, Amrhyn-Notzli c. Chambre du Tessin,
supra n. 54, at p. 566.
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allowed to intrude in settled fields. He may, unless there are
particular topics for which a different procedure is specifically
prescribed by statute, disregard the previous decisions of his own
court and even of any higher court, and is charged with basing
each decision afresh upon the code article or other legislation. In
practice, the growing quantity of reported decisions available in
France and the other countries makes it possible for diligent at-
torneys increasingly to find and refer to previous applications and
conclusions on both sides of the issue they are presenting, and the
courts under this pressure will accept and sometimes themselves
cite a previous decision as an example of a reasoned conclusion in
accord with their own, but they use the cases as insulated and not
conductive as in the common law. The courts do not feel called
upon to explain, distinguish or overrule any case which seems
similar but comes to a different conclusion, considering it only
a non-corroborative instance. A decided case is incapable of
creating a rule of law; and nowhere does the authority of
precedent prevent a decision on the merits of the case at hand.
Students and practitioners of the common law working in com-
parative law may usefully retain some degree of their accustomed
interest in and discussion of decided cases, but should for correct
results keep clearly in mind the true precedence of texts, doctrine
and jurisprudence. They must remember the lawyer is speaking
to a common law audience who says there is no power
"Can alter a decree established:
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error, by the same example,
Will rush into the state."
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TABLE I.
Civil Codes Article Numbers
Year Standard Article
Country of (as in preceding Text)
































1807 4 5 ....
1804 4 5 .
1865 .... ... ...
1867 .... ... ...




1916 5 .... ...
1855 .... ... 3
1887 ---- 17 17
1888 .... ... ...
1889 6 .......
Rep. 1884 4 5 ....
1887 18 .... 3
1886 18 .... ...
1825 9 8 ....
1906 .... ... 3
1928 18 .... ...
1904 443".....
1917 2 .... ...
1869 15 .... ...
1852 8,9 .... ...
1903 .... ... 3
1914 15 .... 12
1922 .... ... ...
(Project) 1932 20 ........
Under Common Law
1870 .... ... ...
[ds.2  1889 6 .... ....
1902 7 .... ...










































'From Code Napoleon, but omitting articles 4 and 5.
2 Same as Spain.
"Code of Civil Procedure (1905).
'Same as Argentina.
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